Promoting Multiple Policies to the Public: The Difficulties of Simultaneously Promoting War and Foreign Humanitarian Aid

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To drum up support for the U.S. military’s efforts abroad, government officials sometimes encourage U.S. residents to justify or excuse (morally disengage from) the resultant casualties. However, although more disengaged U.S. residents are more supportive of war, two studies show that they are also less supportive of foreign humanitarian aid, particularly when American identity is salient and a more global identity, such as moral identity, is not. Study 1 reveals this effect when residents must choose between donating to a charity that benefits foreign civilians and donating to two other charities, one of which benefits U.S. soldiers. Study 2 shows that the effect holds when the opportunity to support foreign civilians appears in isolation, without reference to war or soldiers. Thus, U.S. residents who respond positively to war may exhibit less charitableness toward foreign civilians. For policy makers seeking to disburse foreign aid during war, these findings suggest that any effort to drum up support for war should be accompanied by a corresponding effort to maintain the U.S. public’s goodwill toward foreign civilians.

Keywords: identity, moral disengagement, war, charitable giving

However, President Obama declared another foreign policy goal in his Nobel speech: helping underprivileged people in distant countries. Specifically, he emphasized the importance of promoting education, employment, and healthcare throughout the world (Obama 2009). On the campaign trail, he also mentioned helping other countries, advocating for doubled foreign aid (LaFranchi 2009). Residents of the United States have ample opportunities to support President Obama’s goal of helping impoverished people of other nations: They can contribute to the many charities and corporate social responsibility (CSR) campaigns in the United States, which regularly ask people to donate or make purchases whose proceeds may benefit foreign civilians.

However, if President Obama’s rhetoric promotes moral disengagement from the casualties of war, could it also undermine his goal of gaining support for charitable efforts that assist foreign civilians? To date, moral disengagement literature has not addressed this question and has focused mostly on how disengaging relates to willingness to harm others (e.g., bullying classmates, supporting war, executing death row prisoners) (Aquino et al. 2007; Bandura et al. 1996; McAlister, Bandura, and Owen 2006; Osofsky, Bandura, and Zimbardo 2005). In contrast, this research focuses on how disengaging relates to willingness to help others. Specifically, we propose that disengaging during war relates negatively to support for charities and CSR campaigns that benefit foreign civilians. This idea is consistent with recent psychology findings suggesting that witnessing harm to others in one context can spill over and inhibit...
helpfulness in a subsequent, unrelated context (Bushman and Anderson 2009).

However, we do not expect all U.S. residents who disengage during war to exhibit lower support for charitable efforts that provide foreign aid. To test a possible boundary condition of this effect, we consider the role that two identities—American identity and moral identity—might play in either strengthening or weakening the negative relationship between disengaging and charitableness to foreign civilians. We choose these identities because they are likely to be highly salient when people evaluate war and charity (Aaker and Akutsu 2009; Skitka 2005), so they should moderate the predicted negative relationship between disengaging from war and supporting charitable efforts that benefit foreign civilians.

When people identify with a group, they concentrate on protecting members of that group (i.e., the in-group; Bandura et al. 2006). Alternatively, we explore how reactions to war may increase, which conflicts with the directional influence of morally disengaging from war (see Aquino et al. 2007). These arguments lead us to predict that moral disengagement during war relates negatively to U.S. residents’ support for charities and CSR campaigns that benefit foreign civilians when American identity is active but not when moral identity is active. In other words, an active American identity serves as a strengthening force, bolstering the negative relationship between disengagement and charitableness toward foreign civilians, whereas an active moral identity serves as a countervailing force that weakens that relationship. We expect these hypothesized effects to emerge both when residents must trade off helping foreign civilians against helping U.S. soldiers (Study 1) and when they consider helping foreign civilians in isolation (Study 2).

Our research makes two contributions. First, most research on U.S. wars abroad has assessed how U.S. residents’ reactions to the casualties of war affect support for war (Aquino et al. 2007; McAlister, Bandura, and Owen 2006). Alternatively, we explore how reactions to war may predict subsequent, seemingly unrelated attitudes and behaviors that are directed toward foreign civilians who are not necessarily involved in war. In doing so, we contribute to burgeoning literature on how thoughts triggered in one task relate to both prosocial and antisocial behavior in a later, ostensibly separate task (Bushman and Anderson 2009). This literature is relevant to public policy makers concerned about the unintended and perhaps undesired carryover effects of products (e.g., violent video games unintentionally leading to violent behavior) (Collier, Lidell, and Lidell 2008). In our specific case, understanding the relationship between disengaging from war and support for seemingly unrelated charitable efforts benefiting foreign civilians is important, considering some government officials’ dual focus on waging war while increasing foreign humanitarian aid. If U.S. residents who disengage during war are more likely to support war (McAlister, Bandura, and Owen 2006) but also less likely to support charities that aid foreign civilians, politicians and other concerned parties may find it hard to mobilize public support for war and foreign aid simultaneously.

Second, we contribute to research on the marketing of prosocial initiatives, such as charities and CSR campaigns (Olsen, Pracejus, and Brown 2003; Peloza and Steel 2005), by highlighting the role that identity plays in motivating contributions to these initiatives (Aaker and Akutsu 2009). We show that American identity and moral identity interact with moral disengagement during war to influence support for unrelated charitable efforts that benefit foreign civilians. This insight suggests that disengagement and charitable giving do not necessarily conflict. If marketers and policy makers can influence which identities are salient, they can attenuate the negative association between disengagement during war and support for charitable efforts that aid foreign civilians.

The rest of this article is organized as follows: First, we present our theory and background literature on which it is based. Second, we report the findings of two studies that test our hypotheses. In Study 1, U.S. residents choose between making a real donation to a foreign aid charity versus a charity that supports U.S. soldiers. In Study 2, residents evaluate a product whose sale benefits foreign civilians in a separate, ostensibly unrelated task that makes no mention of war or soldiers. Third, we discuss future research directions and implications for marketing and public policy.

Moral Disengagement Relates Negatively to Charitableness toward Foreign Civilians

With the rise of the Internet and 24-hour news networks, U.S. residents can easily discover how their government’s wars abroad are affecting foreign civilians. For example, they can hear about Afghan children who died when the U.S. dropped bombs on a suspected Al Qaeda meeting place (CNN 2007). The public may find it hard to support a war that creates such hardships for foreign civilians. How do people continue to endorse war if they regularly see its destructive consequences?

Moral disengagement provides one answer to this question. Going to war requires that people do something they would normally deem wrong in everyday life: They must willingly inflict harm on those who have not harmed them. In particular, residents of the country going to war must accept that a war being waged on their behalf will cause civilian casualties. One way to accept this fact more comfortably is by morally disengaging from the consequences of war. When people morally disengage, they justify or excuse harming others, reasoning that the consequences of the harm are not so severe or are morally excusable through extenuating circumstances (Bandura et al. 1996). During the Iraq War for example, U.S. residents could disengage...
by stating that foreign civilians would have been worse off without U.S. intervention (e.g., they would have suffered more had Saddam Hussein remained), or they could argue that harming foreign civilians was acceptable because it was done for a worthy cause (e.g., to spread freedom). President Obama used moral disengagement to justify war in his Nobel speech.

Similar to many other psychological processes, moral disengagement varies across individuals and situations. McAlister, Bandura, and Owen (2006) observe individual differences in moral disengagement; they find that before the September 11 attacks, some U.S. residents were more morally disengaged than others about the possibility of war in Iraq. Moreover, moral disengagement toward the possibility of war was higher after than before the September 11 attacks, suggesting that moral disengagement also fluctuates across situations. Moral disengagement is a continuum, not a binary variable. People are not either disengaged or engaged. Rather, some may be more disengaged than others, and a person may become more versus less disengaged depending on the situation. Consistent with prior research and the notion of moral disengagement as a continuum (Bandura et al. 1996; McAlister, Bandura, and Owen 2006), we measure moral disengagement on continuous scales.

In prior research, U.S. residents who more readily disengaged during war were more likely to support the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and condone U.S. soldiers’ abuse of Iraqi prisoners (Aquino et al. 2007; McAlister, Bandura, and Owen 2006). That is, disengaged U.S. residents adopt more favorable attitudes toward war and are less concerned about its negative consequences. They also may have more favorable attitudes toward those who wage war, namely, U.S. soldiers. Thus, we predict that disengagement during war relates positively to support for charities that aid U.S. soldiers.

But how might disengaging during war relate to people’s subsequent support for a charity or a CSR campaign that aids foreign civilians? When people disengage, they reason that the negative humanitarian consequences of war are not so bad or are worth it. If the consequences no longer appear negative, an associated set of cognitions might indicate that there is little need or obligation to help foreign civilians who endure these consequences. Ultimately, this sort of thinking may spill over, influencing charitableness toward all foreign civilians, whether they are affected by war or not. We test this possibility by hypothesizing that disengagement in the context of war is negatively associated with support for charities and CSR campaigns that aid foreign civilians, even when those charitable efforts seek to help foreign civilians in general and not specifically foreign civilians in war-torn zones.

Recent research on the carryover effects of violent media provides evidence consistent with this hypothesis. Bushman and Anderson (2009) find that violent media make people less helpful and less concerned about the suffering of others in a subsequent, unrelated task. In one study, participants played either a violent or a nonviolent video game, and then all of them overheard a fight that purportedly resulted in an injury to a confederate. Participants who played the violent video game rated the fight as less serious and took longer to help than did participants who played the nonviolent video game. In another study, moviegoers who had just seen a violent rather than a nonviolent movie were less helpful to a needy confederate standing outside the theater. These findings suggest that witnessing the suffering of others in one task can carry over, inhibiting charitableness in a later, unrelated situation. In the same way, we argue that U.S. residents who morally disengage from foreign civilians’ hardships during war should be less charitable toward foreign civilians in a completely separate context.

In summary, we predict that the more disengaged U.S. residents are, the less favorable they are toward charities and CSR campaigns that benefit foreign civilians. Instead, their support is directed toward charitable efforts that aid U.S. soldiers (i.e., members of the in-group), if such an option is available.

**Salient Identities Moderate the Relationship between Disengagement and Charitableness toward Foreign Civilians**

Will morally disengaged people always be less supportive of charities and CSR campaigns that aid foreign civilians? More important, can we determine when disengagement will be more versus less related to support for charitable efforts that benefit foreign civilians? We propose that taking into account people’s views of themselves, and the particular identities that comprise those self-views, might help us answer these questions. We explore two identities—an American identity and a moral identity—that we expect to have opposing moderating effects on the relationship between disengagement and charitableness toward foreign civilians. By American identity, we refer to people’s views of themselves as residents of the United States. By moral identity, we refer to people’s views of themselves with respect to characteristics commonly ascribed to moral individuals (e.g., honesty, kindness) (Aquino and Reed 2002). Those who view moral identity as critical to their self-concept exhibit concern about a wide range of people, including both close (e.g., relatives) and distant (e.g., people of different religions or nationalities) others (Reed and Aquino 2003).

These two identities interest us because they can alter U.S. residents’ psychological boundaries, which in turn may shape judgments of war and aid to foreign civilians (Cohen and Reed 2006). Just as a country’s physical borders determine where its area of concern begins and ends, so do a person’s psychological boundaries determine where his or her area of concern begins and ends. Individual psychological boundaries define the set of others that a person worries about and strives to protect (Reed and Aquino 2003).

However, unlike physical boundaries, psychological boundaries are highly flexible and may vary across individuals and situations. A salient in-group identity, such as an American identity, constrains psychological boundaries to include in-group members (other U.S. residents) but exclude nonmembers (nonresidents). As a result, people with constricted psychological boundaries exhibit hostility (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis 2002), political violence (Bandura 1999; Staub 2003), and decreased helping (Loewenstein and Small 2007) toward nonmembers. In contrast, a salient moral identity expands psychological boundaries to
include a broad range of people, from close friends and relatives to faraway people in distant countries (Reed and Aquino 2003). As a result, people with expanded psychological boundaries exhibit increased charitable and helping behaviors toward distant others (e.g., Levine et al. 2005; Reed and Aquino 2003; Small and Simonsohn 2008).

We hypothesize that American identity and moral identity have opposing moderating effects on the relationship between moral disengagement during war and charitableness toward foreign civilians. These opposing effects likely emerge because international war pits the well-being of the United States against the well-being of people in other countries. In such a context, American identity is likely to increase concern for U.S. residents, at the expense of concern for foreign civilians, and moral identity is likely to do the opposite. However, this proposal does not mean these identities always oppose each other; in the “General Discussion” section, we consider situations in which they might be entirely consistent. For now though, we focus on contexts in which the two identities have opposing effects.

American Identity

People are more helpful toward members of their own group (in-group) than toward members of other groups (out-groups) (Levine et al. 2005; Tajfel et al. 1971). This effect is more pronounced among people who are committed to their group and thus presumably view their in-group identity as critical to their self-concept (Ellemers et al. 1999; Nadler, Harpaz-Gorodeisky, and Ben-David 2009). Thus, when American identity is activated, either because it is chronically present in people’s views of themselves or because the situation makes it salient, U.S. residents are likely to act in a manner consistent with that identity (Oyserman 2009). Because American identity refers to people’s views of themselves as U.S. residents, one identity-consistent behavior would be to do less to further foreign civilians’ well-being and more to further U.S. residents’ well-being. An American identity therefore should reinforce disengagement, in that both relate negatively to support for foreign civilians and positively to support for U.S. soldiers during war. Therefore, we hypothesize that the negative association between disengagement and support for charitable efforts that aid foreign civilians is stronger when American identity is strongly activated, compared with when it is weakly activated (Study 1) or when a moral identity is activated (Study 2). In addition, we do not restrict the notion of American identity exclusively to U.S. citizens. Anyone can hold an American identity to varying degrees, so our samples consist of U.S. residents, some of whom are citizens and some of whom are not. We measure or prime their American identities and examine their subsequent charitableness toward foreign civilians.

Moral Identity

Similar to American identity, moral identity is one of many identities that people might possess. Aquino and Reed (2002) asked people to list the traits that come to mind when thinking about what it means to be moral and then selected the nine most frequently listed ones to measure and temporarily prime that identity (Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007). When moral identity is chronically or situationally activated, people seek to act in a manner congruent with that identity (Oyserman 2009), meaning that they aim to exhibit honesty, kindness, and the other traits commonly ascribed to moral persons (Aquino and Reed 2002). People generally protect close others (Tajfel and Turner 1986), but possessing a strong moral identity makes people compassionate toward distant others too (Reed and Aquino 2003). Thus, when U.S. residents focus on their moral identity, they should be relatively more inclined to help foreign civilians. This behavior is inconsistent with the predicted relationship between disengagement and support for foreign aid: Whereas moral identity should relate positively to support for charitable efforts that aid foreign civilians, disengagement during war should relate negatively to it. Considering its competing influence on support for foreign civilians, we hypothesize that moral identity undermines disengagement (see Figure 1); that is, the negative association between disengagement and support for charitable efforts that aid foreign civilians is weaker when moral identity is strongly activated compared with when it is weakly activated (Study 1) or when a more restrictive American identity is activated (Study 2).

\( H_1 \): Moral disengagement during war relates negatively to support for charitable efforts that benefit foreign civilians, especially when an American (moral) identity is more (less) rather than less (more) central to the self-concept and when an American as opposed to moral identity is temporarily primed.

Study 1

With Study 1, conducted just after September 11, we tested our hypotheses to determine whether they predict real donations. Participants allocated $4 across three charities: the Global Fund, the United Services Organization (USO), and Amnesty International. Each charity represented a key construct. The Global Fund combats illness in developing countries; donating to this charity reflects a general desire to help foreign civilians. The USO helps U.S. soldiers; donating to this charity reflects support for U.S. military efforts. Amnesty International protects the human rights of all people, including the prisoners the United States takes during war; donating to this charity reflects a willingness to help all humans, even those foreigners whom the United States views as enemies. Disengaging should be negatively associated with donations to the Global Fund (benefiting foreign civilians) but positively associated with donations to the USO (benefiting U.S. soldiers) when an American identity is more central to the self-concept and moral identity is less central. For reasons discussed subsequently, we had no a priori hypotheses about how our independent variables would relate to donations to Amnesty International.

Method

Participants

One hundred forty-one participants (80 men) received $10 for completing one hour of assorted studies in a behavioral lab. They ranged in age from 18 to 58 years (\( M = 24.27 \) years, SD = 8.32 years). In the sample, 93 were U.S.
citizens, and 48 were not. The ethnic composition was as follows: 54 White, 12 African American, 15 Asian American, 11 Latino or Hispanic, and 49 other, mixed, or unreported. Participants were either community residents or students and staff of a northeastern U.S. university, whom we recruited through fliers placed on and around campus. Experimental proctors provided an overview of the lab’s activities and administered the ostensibly unrelated surveys. After finishing all tasks, participants were debriefed and paid $10.

**Procedure**

In the lab, participants completed five ostensibly unrelated tasks, which measured the variables (the Appendixes contain the complete measures). The first task contained various measures, including the American and moral identity scales. The next exercise was a filler task involving an assessment of car advertisements. The third task, presented on a computer, involved a study of participants’ reactions to news events. Participants viewed a slide show containing 11 pictures from the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, presented at four seconds per picture. Following the show, participants received a survey that assessed their moral judgments about the pictures, as well as their general propensity to morally disengage. The next task was a filler task involving price fairness judgments in hypothetical scenarios. At the end of the session, participants completed a resource allocation task, which we used to capture actual donation behavior.

**Variables**

*Moral disengagement.* Participants watched a slide show containing images from the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The images documented U.S. soldiers’ abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Just after seeing these images, participants completed a survey, which included an eight-item disengagement scale adapted from past research (Bandura et al. 1996) ($\alpha = .79$). Although this scale did not mention war, we reasoned that participants would interpret it in the context of war, because they completed it after seeing the Abu Ghraib images.

At first glance, the Abu Ghraib images might seem like an excessively heavy-handed way to encourage participants to think about war. Armies do not always commit egregious, purposeful abuses during war, and even when they do, the
Amnesty International. They privately allocated the money to civilians. Consistent with this interpretation, Reed and Aquino (2003) empirically find that the internalization component of the moral identity scale may not have the expansive psychological boundaries that we predict moderate the relationship between global war-torn zones. Thus, this charity enabled us to see how the moral identity of three charities: the Global Fund, the USO, and Amnesty International with donations to the USO. With this Amnesty International versus USO comparison, we assessed participants’ willingness to aid victims of human rights abuses rather than U.S. soldiers. To operationalize this construct, we subtracted the amount each participant donated to the USO from the amount he or she gave to the Global Fund. The resultant variable is referred to as Global Fund versus USO. Higher scores on this variable reflect a willingness to give less aid to U.S. soldiers and thus give more aid to foreign civilians. This willingness to favor the Global Fund over the USO in turn should relate negatively to disengagement, particularly among U.S. residents whose sense of who they are revolves around their American identity but not their moral identity. If this hypothesis receives support, war is associated not only with hostility toward the wartime enemy (e.g., prisoners) but also with reduced charitableness toward any distant others, even if they are not wartime enemies.

Similar to the Global Fund, Amnesty International strives to help people around the world. However, Amnesty International did not capture aid to foreign civilians uninvolved in war as well as the Global Fund did, for two key reasons. First, Amnesty International operates in the United States and potentially aids U.S. residents as well as foreign civilians. Second, Amnesty International protects the human rights of all people, including the U.S.’s wartime enemies (e.g., prisoners at Abu Ghraib), so it could aid foreign civilians and prisoners affected by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The Global Fund did not have either of these drawbacks.

Nevertheless, we also compared donations to Amnesty International with donations to the USO. With this Amnesty International versus USO comparison, we assessed participants’ willingness to aid victims of human rights abuses rather than U.S. soldiers. To operationalize this construct, we subtracted the amount each participant donated to the USO from the amount he or she gave to Amnesty International. However, we had no a priori hypotheses regarding Amnesty International versus USO donations, due to the ambiguity of who was likely to benefit from Amnesty International aid.

Control variables. Age and sex correlate with views of war (Heskin and Power 2001; McAlister, Bandura, and Owen 2006), so we controlled for these variables in Studies 1 and 2.

Results

The participants had a total of $564 (141 participants × $4) to donate. They gave $269 (48%) to the Global Fund, $108 (19%) to the USO, and $187 (33%) to Amnesty International. Therefore, participants gave very little of their money to U.S. soldiers (USO), preferring instead to give it to victims of human rights abuses (Amnesty International) or foreign civilians afflicted with deadly illnesses (Global Fund). However, our interest was less in total allocations to each charity and more in how these allocations varied as a function of moral disengagement, American identity, and moral identity. To answer these latter questions, we ran two separate analyses.

In the first set of analyses, which we refer to as illustrative analyses, we dichotomized the three independent variables...
and examined how high versus low disengagers allocated their dollars, depending on whether they were high or low on American identity centrality and high or low on moral identity centrality. Participants were classified as low (high) on moral disengagement, American identity, and moral identity if they fell below (above) the median on the measure of that variable. We then created four groups to examine how moral disengagement and American identity jointly related to donation patterns (low disengagers who were low or high on American identity centrality versus high disengagers who were low or high on American identity centrality) and four groups to examine how moral disengagement and moral identity jointly related to donation patterns (low disengagers who were low or high on moral identity centrality versus high disengagers who were low or high on moral identity centrality). Next, we computed the total number of dollars that each of these groups had available to donate (i.e., number of participants in the group \( \times \$4 \)), and we calculated what proportion of these available dollars each group donated to each charity (see Figures 2 and 3).

The illustrative analyses revealed the pattern of results but did not allow us to perform appropriate statistical tests of our hypotheses. Therefore, a second set of analyses, which we refer to as the regression analyses, used regressions with continuous independent variables.

**Donations to the Global Fund Versus the USO**

We first examined donations to the Global Fund relative to the USO. Everyone, regardless of moral disengagement, American identity centrality, or moral identity centrality, gave more of each dollar to the Global Fund than they gave to the USO. However, the advantage of the Global Fund over the USO varied as a function of our independent variables.

**Illustrative analyses.** Consider first the illustrative analyses for moral disengagement and American identity, with these variables dichotomized (see Figure 2). Among those for whom American identity was more central, low disengagers gave 49 cents per dollar to the Global Fund and 20 cents to the USO (a difference of 29 cents), whereas high disengagers gave 38 cents per dollar to the Global Fund and 33 cents to the USO (a difference of 5 cents). Thus, a rise in disengagement was associated with a shift of 24 cents per dollar away from the Global Fund and toward the USO among those for whom American identity was more central. However, among those for whom American identity was less central, a rise in disengagement was associated with a shift of only 3 cents per dollar away from the Global Fund and toward the USO. Therefore, high disengagers gave a smaller proportion of each dollar to the Global Fund and a larger proportion to the USO compared with low disengagers, especially when their American identity was more rather than less central. This finding suggests that American identity operated in the same direction as moral disengagement. High disengagers gave less to the Global Fund and more to the USO than low disengagers, and this trend was more pronounced among those for whom American identity was more central.

Consider now the results for moral disengagement and moral identity, with these variables dichotomized (see Figure 3). Among those for whom moral identity was less central, low disengagers gave 53 cents per dollar to the Global Fund and 14 cents to the USO (a difference of 39 cents), whereas high disengagers gave 44 cents per dollar to the Global Fund and 28 cents to the USO (a difference of 16 cents). Thus, a rise in disengagement was associated with a shift of 23 cents per dollar away from the Global Fund and toward the USO among those for whom moral identity was less central. In contrast, among those for whom moral identity was more central, a rise in disengagement was associated with a shift of only 9 cents per dollar away from the Global Fund and toward the USO. Therefore, moral identity operated in opposition to moral disengagement: High disengagers gave less to the Global Fund and more to the USO than low disengagers did, but this trend was less pronounced among those for whom moral identity was more central.

**Regression analyses.** To confirm these results with continuous independent variables, we ran a hierarchical regression predicting Global Fund versus USO donations. We entered the effects in the following order: (1) control variables; (2) main effects of moral disengagement, American identity, and moral identity; and (3) the moral disengagement \( \times \) American identity and moral disengagement \( \times \) moral identity interactions. Throughout this study, we mean-centered all continuous independent variables to reduce multicollinearity (Aiken and West 1991).

The results revealed a significant negative effect of American identity on donations to the Global Fund relative to the USO \((b = -0.27, t(140) = -2.08, p < .05)\). We obtained the predicted moral disengagement \( \times \) American identity \((b = -0.48, t(140) = -2.52, p < .05)\) and moral disengagement \( \times \) moral identity \((b = 0.72, t(140) = 3.81, p < .001)\) interactions. To understand these interactions, we investigated the relationship between moral disengagement and donations to the Global Fund, relative to the USO, at one standard deviation below and above the mean on American identity, as well as at one standard deviation below and above the mean on moral identity (Aiken and West 1991). As we predicted, moral disengagement related negatively to favoring the Global Fund over the USO for those who scored high \((b = -0.86, t(140) = -2.90, p < .01)\) but not low \((b = 0.20, t(140) = 0.63, n.s.)\) on American identity centrality and for those who scored low \((b = -0.94, t(140) = -3.67, p < .001)\) but not high \((b = 0.29, t(140) = 0.98, n.s.)\) on moral identity centrality (see Figure 4).

Although we did not expect our results to differ for U.S. citizens versus noncitizens, we ran our regression only for U.S. citizens \((n = 93)\). The pattern and interpretation of the results remained the same, though some effects were less significant due to the reduced power of the tests.

In summary, we found support for our hypotheses. With American identity activated and moral identity not activated, moral disengagement was associated with a shift in donations away from the foreign civilian–benefiting Global Fund and toward the U.S. soldier–benefiting USO. Even when faced with evidence of U.S. soldiers’ misbehavior at Abu Ghraib, morally disengaged U.S. residents with a highly central American identity and a less central moral identity were willing to favor U.S. soldiers over foreign civilians who were uninvolved in war.
Figure 2. Proportion of Dollars Allocated to Each Charity as a Function of Moral Disengagement and American Identity

Notes: Participants were classified as low (high) on a measure if they fell below (above) the median on that measure. Those falling right at the median on a measure were excluded from this illustrative presentation, but including them did not alter the pattern or interpretation of the results.

Figure 3. Proportion of Dollars Allocated to Each Charity as a Function of Moral Disengagement and Moral Identity

Notes: Participants were classified as low (high) on a measure if they fell below (above) the median on that measure. Those falling right at the median on a measure were excluded from this illustrative presentation, but including them did not alter the pattern or interpretation of the results.
Donations to Amnesty International Versus the USO

Illustrative analyses. We ran the same analyses for Amnesty International versus USO donations. Consider first the results for moral disengagement and American identity, with these variables dichotomized (see Figure 2). A rise in disengagement was associated with a shift of 15 cents per dollar away from Amnesty International and toward the USO among those for whom American identity was more central and a shift of 18 cents per dollar among those for whom American identity was less central. Thus, high disengagers gave less of each dollar to Amnesty International and more to the USO than low disengagers did, especially when American identity was less rather than more central.

Next consider the results for moral disengagement and moral identity, with these variables dichotomized (see Figure 3). A rise in disengagement was associated with a shift of 20 cents per dollar away from Amnesty International and toward the USO among those for whom moral identity was less central but with a shift of only 15 cents per dollar among those for whom moral identity was more central. Therefore, high disengagers gave less of each dollar to Amnesty International and more to the USO compared with low disengagers, but this was less so.
when moral identity was highly central to participants’ sense of self.

Regression analyses. To confirm these results with continuous independent variables, we ran the same regression model for the Amnesty International versus USO donations as we ran for the Global Fund versus USO donations. Negative main effects of moral disengagement (b = –.47, t(140) = –2.21, p < .05) and American identity (b = –.35, t(140) = –2.76, p < .01) emerged: Both variables were associated with a shift in donations away from Amnesty International and toward the USO. However, the moral disengagement × American identity and moral disengagement × moral identity interactions were not significant, perhaps for the reasons we discussed previously regarding the ambiguity in who benefits from Amnesty International aid. This ambiguity was why we had no a priori hypotheses about Amnesty International and why our theorizing focused on the Global Fund versus the USO. This study’s main contribution thus has been to examine how donations during war shift away from charities such as the Global Fund, which benefit foreign civilians uninvolved in war, and toward charities such as the USO, which benefit U.S. soldiers.

Discussion
The findings related to donations to the Global Fund relative to the USO support our hypothesis. Participants who rationalized harming others during war donated less to a charity that aids foreign civilians (Global Fund) and more to a cause that aids U.S. soldiers (USO). However, this pattern only emerged when American identity, which we expected to reinforce disengagement, was more central and when moral identity, which we expected to undermine disengagement, was less central.

What might our results mean for total donations to the Global Fund and the USO in times of war? Given the correlational design of Study 1 and the many factors likely to influence donations, we do not wish to speculate too much. Nevertheless, we ran a few “what-if” analyses to determine how total donations to these two charities would change if the theory we have proposed is correct and if the average level of moral disengagement, American identity, and moral identity (but not the average level of any other variables) changed in the population of actual and prospective donors to these charities.

In 2009, the Global Fund collected $2,590,436,000 in donations from both governments and the private sector, and the USO collected $70,524,541 in donations from foundations, individuals, and the private sector (Global Fund 2009; United Services Organization 2009). Therefore, the two organizations collected a total of $2,660,960,541 in donations, and the Global Fund collected $2,519,911,459 more in donations than the USO did.

Recall that in our data, a rise in disengagement (from below to above the median) was associated with a shift of 24 cents per dollar from the Global Fund to the USO when American identity was more central to participants’ sense of self but a shift of only 3 cents per dollar when American identity was less central. Moreover, a rise in disengagement was associated with a shift of 23 cents per dollar from the Global Fund to the USO when moral identity was less central but with a shift of only 9 cents per dollar when moral identity was more central.

According to these shifts in funding, and assuming a consistent total amount donated across the two charities, moral disengagement would have different effects depending on actual and prospective U.S. donors’ American identity. A rise from low to high disengagement would be associated with approximately $1 billion less donated to the Global Fund and approximately $975 million more donated to the USO if American identity were highly central but only about $88 million less donated to the Global Fund and $17 million more donated to the USO if American identity were less central.

Likewise, moral disengagement would have different effects depending on actual and prospective U.S. donors’ moral identity. A rise from low to high disengagement would be associated with approximately $743 million less donated to the Global Fund and approximately $673 million more donated to the USO if moral identity were less central but only about $328 million less donated to the Global Fund and $257 million more donated to the USO if moral identity were more central. Thus, war and the psychological processes it awakens could have major effects on how donors in the United States allocate their dollars, particularly if American identity is more activated and moral identity is less activated.

Despite supporting our hypotheses, Study 1 has several limitations. First, we did not obtain significant results for donations to Amnesty International relative to the USO. However, this finding does not really surprise us, because the Global Fund represents foreign aid better than Amnesty International does. Second, this study used a sample comprised primarily of college students, which could be problematic because college students may understand researchers better than nonstudents do. Therefore, people prone to socially desirable responding may express a less central American identity, a more central moral identity, or a preference for the Global Fund if they believe the researchers hold these views. If this bias existed, the observed results would be driven by social desirability concerns, not by our framework. This issue would be less of a concern if we had manipulated the study variables. However, we measured all the variables, so it is difficult to draw causal conclusions.

To address the social desirability and causality limitations, we conducted Study 2 and manipulated rather than measured American and moral identities. Because we randomly assigned participants to conditions, the average tendency toward socially desirable responding should not differ in any systematic way across the two priming conditions. Thus, any results we observe in Study 2 cannot be explained by socially desirable responding. Moreover, Study 2 enables us to make more confident causal assertions about our theory.

Study 2
Study 2, conducted five years after the start of war in Iraq, builds on Study 1 in four ways. First, Study 1 required that people trade off donating to a charity that aids foreign civilians against donating to a charity that aids U.S. soldiers.
Therefore, the negative relationship between disengagement and charitableness toward foreign civilians might have arisen because we forced a trade-off. Study 2 eliminated the trade-off and presented the opportunity to support foreign aid separately, which provided a stronger test of the spillover effect. Second, with Study 2 we manipulated American and moral identity, temporarily heightening the salience of one or the other. We then assessed how disengagement related to charitableness toward foreign civilians, as well as how the nature of this relationship varied with an activated American identity compared with an activated moral identity. Third, in Study 2 we operationalized support for foreign aid differently by asking participants to evaluate a product whose sale purportedly aided needy foreign civilians. Operationalizing foreign aid as a CSR effort rather than as a charity enabled us to assess the generalizability of our findings.

Fourth, Study 2 attempted to test the effects of moral disengagement and identity activation in a more subtle and unobtrusive way than Study 1. Specifically, participants sampled bottled water, whose manufacturer purportedly would donate a portion of the proceeds to the Global Fund. The dependent variable was participants’ ratings of the bottled water’s taste. We predict that more disengaged participants would like the water less, but only when we primed their American as opposed to their moral identity. If moral disengagement and identity jointly predict differences in ratings of water taste, the psychological processes we describe may affect even highly reflexive and largely nonconscious processes such as physical sensations. Some research has investigated how marketing cues, such as brand name or price, can alter taste perceptions (e.g., Hoegg and Alba 2007; Hoyer and Brown 1990). Similarly, we examine the possibility that consumers like the taste of a product more or less, depending on whether they feel an affinity for the charity that the product purportedly supports and highlights in product advertisements. According to our theoretical model, as consumers grow increasingly disengaged, they should assign lower ratings to the taste of bottled water benefiting the Global Fund, particularly if their American as opposed to their moral identity is salient.

Method

Participants
The sample consisted of 63 participants (34 men) recruited from the same population as in Study 1. They ranged in age from 18 to 54 years (M = 22.92 years, SD = 6.25 years). In the sample, 42 were U.S. citizens, and 21 were not. The ethnic composition was as follows: 30 White, 7 African American, 13 Asian American, 1 Latino or Hispanic, and 12 other.

Procedure
Participants were seated at computers to complete all parts of the study. They first filled out an online survey containing measures of moral disengagement and demographics. Next, they watched a slide show that primed either American or moral identity, and finally, they answered a computerized survey containing manipulation checks and other unrelated questions.

After the slide show, participants received a packet. The front page stated that university professors were providing consulting services to a bottled water company and that participants would be asked to sample and evaluate the water. Subsequent pages asked participants about their past experiences with bottled water and provided information about the company. Participants were told that the company planned to donate 5% of its 2008 profits to the Global Fund, and they read a description of the Global Fund. A lab staff member then brought participants a small cup of bottled water purportedly manufactured by the company. Participants tried the water, returned the cup, and received a second packet containing measures of liking for the water’s taste. At the end of their time in the lab, participants were debriefed and paid $10.

During the study, we measured or manipulated the variables we describe next. The Appendixes contain all the measures.

Variables

Moral disengagement. Participants indicated their agreement with three statements that excused harming others during war (e.g., “Military force is justified when a nation’s economic security is threatened”) (adapted from McAllister, Bandura, and Owen 2006) (α = .77). Greater agreement indicated greater disengagement.

Identity prime. In an ostensibly unrelated study, we primed either American or moral identity using a two-minute slide show. Participants were randomly assigned to see one of the two primes. Our cover story stated that the study’s purpose was to assess the effectiveness of a new software program designed to improve slide show quality. Participants were told that they would watch a randomly selected slide show that had been modified using the software. They would then answer questions about the quality of the images and sounds in the slide show and the slide show’s content. We purportedly asked content questions so that we could control for miscellaneous factors that might have influenced quality ratings. Each slide show contained the quotes and images described next. The American and moral identity slide shows used the same music and followed the same structure (one quote after every seven images).

American identity prime. This slide show was designed to make people reflect on their affiliation with the United States. The images in the show captured key moments in U.S. history and drew attention to the ideals that Americans typically ascribe to their country. To emphasize the freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution, we included images of people voting and speaking at town hall meetings. To underscore the diversity and economic opportunities that are thought to characterize the United States, we added photographs of immigrants. To highlight the United States’s status as a progressive, developed country, we inserted pictures of students obtaining their degrees, scientists working in a laboratory, and NASA employees at Mission Control. The quotes elicited pride in the United States and called to mind the ideals portrayed by the images.

Moral identity prime. When asked to describe a highly moral person, people often mention the characteristics in
Aquino and Reed’s (2002) instrument. In our slide show, we underscored these attributes by inserting pictures of ordinary people helping one another. People also tend to base their definition of morality on highly principled historical figures or “exemplars” (Aquino and Reed 2002, p. 1425). Thus, we added pictures of Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., and other people generally thought to epitomize moral righteousness. Finally, those who cherish their moral identity help people from a wide variety of backgrounds and do not restrict their attention to members of their own social groups (Reed and Aquino 2003). We captured this aspect of moral identity by inserting images that emphasized the interconnectedness of all human beings. The quotes in the slide show focused on the same ideas.

Identity prime manipulation checks. Six statements assessed how closely affiliated participants felt to the United States after watching the slide show (α = .90), and six statements assessed how moral participants felt after watching the slide show (α = .94). Participants in the American prime condition felt significantly more American (M AmericanScale, AmericanPrime = 5.05, M AmericanScale, MoralPrime = 3.62, t(61) = 5.42, p < .001) and less moral (M MoralScale, AmericanPrime = 3.99, M MoralScale, MoralPrime = 4.98, t(61) = –2.93, p < .01) than those in the moral prime condition. Thus, our manipulations had the intended effects.

Bottled water taste. Participants rated how well several adjectives described the water’s taste (e.g., refreshing, cool, thirst quenching) (α = .93). Higher numbers reflected better taste.

Results and Discussion
We ran a hierarchical regression predicting water taste ratings, in which we entered the following elements in order: (1) control variables, (2) the main effects of moral disengagement and the prime, and (3) the moral disengagement × prime interaction.

As we predicted, a moral disengagement × prime interaction emerged (b = –.50, t(62) = –2.38, p < .05). Consistent with our predictions, disengagement related negatively to taste ratings when American identity was primed (b = –.34, t(29) = –2.15, p < .05) but not when moral identity was primed (b = .17, t(32) = 1.16, n.s.) (see Figure 5). Therefore, the more disengaged participants were, the less they liked a product benefiting foreign civilians when their American as opposed to their moral identity was primed. With these results involving an identity manipulation, we can more confidently state that American or moral identity salience caused the observed pattern of results. However, our ability to draw causal conclusions about moral disengagement remained limited, because we measured this variable.

Again, we ran our regression just for U.S. citizens (N = 42). The moral disengagement × prime interaction remained negative and significant. Moreover, the pattern and interpretation of the results remained the same, though the significance of some of the follow-up analyses declined due to the reduced power of the tests.

In summary, Study 2 supports our hypothesis that when American identity is salient and moral identity is not, disengaging during war is negatively associated with liking for products whose manufacturers provide aid to foreign civilians. This effect occurs when the consideration of the product benefiting foreign civilians is entirely separate from mentions of war or U.S. soldiers.

General Discussion
Our studies show that disengaging shifts U.S. residents’ goodwill toward charitable efforts that aid U.S. soldiers and
away from charitable efforts that aid foreign civilians. Therefore, when a situation pits Americans’ well-being against foreigners’ well-being, more disengaged U.S. residents prefer helping Americans more so than less disengaged U.S. residents. This preference is particularly pronounced when residents’ American identity is more pronounced rather than less central to their self-concept and when their moral identity is less rather than more central, as Study 1 demonstrated.

The results of Study 1 are intriguing but perhaps not all that surprising, considering the well-documented and pervasive tendency toward in-group favoritism (Sherif et al. 1961). More surprising is that justifying or excusing (i.e., disengaging from) the casualties of war relates negatively to charitableness toward foreign civilians, even when these civilians are not in war-torn zones and even when people do not have to choose between helping these civilians and helping U.S. soldiers, as we found in Study 2. In this second study, we never mentioned war and U.S. soldiers as the participants evaluated products benefiting foreign civilians, and people did not have to trade off aid to foreign civilians against aid to U.S. soldiers. Moreover, we used a far less obtrusive measure of charitableness toward foreign civilians: the taste of bottled water whose sale purportedly benefited foreign civilians. Nevertheless, we still found that more disengaged people were less likely to like the taste of a bottled water whose sale benefited foreign civilians, though only when their American as opposed to moral identity was salient.

Together, our studies suggest that the psychological processes that are positively associated with support for war are also negatively associated with support for foreign humanitarian aid. Throughout this study, we have suggested that moral disengagement, along with a relatively more activated American identity and a relatively less activated moral identity, increases support for war. But the reverse probably also occurs. That is, war likely increases moral disengagement and the salience of American identity while reducing the salience of moral identity, thereby restricting U.S. residents’ psychological boundaries to include people in the United States but exclude foreign civilians. Consistent with this idea, the level of moral disengagement in a representative U.S. sample increased following September 11 (McAllister, Bandura, and Owen 2006), and American flags were more prevalent (Skitka 2005). These observations suggest that when a nation is attacked and preparing to go to war, its people become more disengaged from the humanitarian casualties that are likely to result and become more focused on their national identity. Therefore, war may create a vicious cycle: The government promotes disengagement, along with a heightened national identity and an attenuated moral identity, to drum up support for war. In turn, the act of going to war heightens disengagement and national identity while attenuating moral identity, further increasing support for war. As war propagates, disengagement and national identity likely grow stronger, resulting in progressively less support for foreign aid. This vicious cycle may be particularly strong at the start of war, when the government is especially diligent about boosting national identity through official speeches and when national residents have not yet grown weary of the negative humanitarian consequences of war.

However, just as vicious cycles may emerge in times of war, virtuous cycles also may emerge if individual actors and policy makers take appropriate steps. For example, investing in a nation’s food marketing systems reduces intergroup conflict and improves its social welfare (Shultz et al. 2005). These positive outcomes improve the nation’s international relations and have beneficial spillover effects on other countries. For example, after the vicious cycle of war, many nations of the former Yugoslavia entered a virtuous cycle in large part because of improved food marketing (Shultz et al. 2005). Yugoslavia’s experience suggests that the vicious cycle we have proposed may not emerge and that steps could be taken to propagate a virtuous cycle instead.

Implications for Marketing Charitable Efforts in Times of War

War may relate negatively to prosocial behavior for two key reasons. First, less money is available to give, because it instead must be directed to war efforts (Shultz 2007). Second, even if the same amount of money were available, the public may be less inclined to give it to foreign civilians, because of their reduced concern for the needs of foreign civilians. Our research focuses on this second reason. It highlights how war, a public policy seemingly unrelated to the efforts of charities such as the Global Fund, nevertheless can influence donations to charities, as well as liking for products linked to those charities. Moreover, it suggests that charitable efforts and CSR campaigns benefiting foreign civilians may find it particularly difficult to obtain support in times of war. If a product partners with a charity benefiting foreign civilians, moral disengagement, in conjunction with a highly salient American identity and a less salient moral identity, could even have a negative relationship with ratings of product attributes that seemingly are unassociated with war and charitable giving, such as taste (Study 2). This trend may emerge because nondiagnostic cues in the environment influence taste ratings (Hoegg and Alba 2007; Hoyer and Brown 1990). The question then becomes how the marketers of charitable efforts and CSR campaigns benefiting foreign civilians can promote their causes despite these trends.

Sometimes firms launching a CSR campaign have leeway when choosing a charity to support. For example, a department store could easily donate a portion of its proceeds to either the Global Fund or the USO. If a corporation has this sort of flexibility in a time of war, it may want to consider teaming up with the USO or some other charity that benefits U.S. residents. That way, the corporation can take advantage of the U.S. government’s statements, which likely promote disengagement and highlight American identity. Moreover, it may want to advertise on news channels that are known to air government officials’ speeches about the war.

However, not all firms and charities can choose which efforts to support. Charities such as the Global Fund already have made commitments to helping foreigners and cannot take this commitment back simply because the nation has gone to war. Likewise, some firms collaborate with the same charities year after year and cannot switch
easily to another charity whenever the political climate happens to change. Our research suggests that these charitable efforts therefore should concentrate on two key issues when promoting themselves. First, they should emphasize the ways in which their work ultimately benefits Americans. For example, the Global Fund could highlight how combating illness in developing countries improves economic well-being abroad and thus increases foreign consumers’ ability to purchase U.S. products. Alternatively, charitable efforts could try to reduce U.S. residents’ moral disengagement, perhaps by showing photographs of helpless, innocent civilians whose suffering cannot possibly be justified. They could also downplay American identity and highlight moral identity by emphasizing that foreign civilians just want peace, food, water, and health for themselves and their children, just as U.S. residents want. By drawing attention to the things that U.S. residents and foreign civilians have in common, charities can encourage people to identify more as citizens of humanity and less as residents of the United States. These interventions would temporarily increase U.S. residents’ concern for the well-being of foreign civilians (Reed and Aquino 2003). Then, U.S. residents would be more likely to contribute to charities and CSR initiatives benefiting foreign civilians.

Implications for Public Policy Makers

Similar to charities and CSR campaigns, policy makers want to encourage U.S. residents to aid foreign civilians. Just after the earthquake in Haiti, President Obama promised the United States would aid in rebuilding efforts, and he urged ordinary Americans to donate to humanitarian relief agencies (Obama 2010). Unfortunately, our research suggests that U.S. residents’ helpfulness toward foreign civilians may be lower during war. Thus, policy makers need to find innovative ways to drum up support for foreign aid in times of war.

One possibility is to take advantage of the moral disengagement that is prevalent in times of war and harness it so that it encourages rather than discourages charitable giving to foreigners. People can morally disengage from the casualties of war in various ways (McAlister, Bandura, and Owen 2006). Some ways, such as dehumanization, involve making the foreign victims of war seem less than human and hence unworthy of compassion. This strategy clearly appeared in President George W. Bush’s final State of the Union address, in which he referred to terrorists as “evil men,” “extremists,” and “enemies” (Bush 2008). The implication was that terrorists could not understand reason as most humans would and thus do not deserve the treatment accorded to humans. In contrast, other means of disengaging, such as moral justification, argue that war is necessary to liberate innocent foreign civilians from oppression and dictatorship. This strategy was also evident in President Bush’s address; Bush (2008) spoke of “jubilant Iraqis holding up ink-stained fingers and celebrating their freedom” and implied that the U.S.’s military intervention in Iraq had facilitated this joyful moment for Iraqis. With these words, Bush described Iraqi foreign civilians as worthy of compassion. Therefore, to promote war as well as charitableness toward foreign civilians, policy makers can draw on disengagement strategies that promote (e.g., moral justification) rather than undermine (e.g., dehumanization) compassion for foreign civilians.

A second possibility is for policy makers to capitalize on the American identity that is already salient as a result of war. In particular, policy makers can emphasize that it is part of the U.S. character to extend a helping hand to those in need. President Obama did precisely that in his Newsweek article on the Haiti crisis, in which he wrote, “In times of tragedy, the United States of America steps forward and helps. That is who we are” (Obama 2010). By framing aid to foreign civilians in this light, policy makers can combat in-group favoritism, the usual tendency triggered when in-group identity is salient, and instead link foreign aid to American identity.

Future Research Directions

Manipulating the Type of Appeal to Maximize Giving to Charitable Efforts During War

Our work leaves many questions open for further research. Our studies described charities and CSR campaigns the same way to all participants. In reality, however, charitable efforts have choices about how to present themselves to potential donors. Certain advertisements may be more effective than others at promoting charitable efforts in times of war.

For example, advertisements can emphasize how donating will benefit either the self or others (Nelson et al. 2006). Prior research has shown that self-focused appeals are more persuasive for people who have been culturally reared to focus on career and salary goals (e.g., U.S. men), whereas other-focused appeals are more persuasive for people who have been culturally reared to focus on relationship goals (e.g., U.S. women) (Nelson et al. 2006). In the context of our research, perhaps self-focused appeals are more persuasive among U.S. residents who are more disengaged and have been primed with a self-focused identity such as their American identity, whereas other-focused appeals are more persuasive among U.S. residents who are less disengaged and have been primed with an other-focused identity such as their moral identity. Additional research should investigate how the activated identity and disengagement interact with the type of appeal to influence persuasiveness.

Addressing the Potential for Identity Conflict in Times of War

We have shown that American identity and moral identity exert opposite effects on the relationship between disengagement and support for war and on the relationship between disengagement and support for foreign humanitarian aid. With this finding, we might wonder if American identity and moral identity are mutually exclusive. That is, perhaps having a salient or a highly central American identity precludes having a salient or a highly central moral identity, and vice versa. However, we found no evidence for exclusivity. In our data, the centrality of American identity and the centrality of moral identity sometimes
positively correlated and sometimes were uncorrelated, but they were not negatively correlated.

Nevertheless, our data still reveal that American identity and moral identity have opposing moderating effects in the context of disengagement from the casualties of war. If so, how can people hold both identities and value them both highly? Would people not feel conflicted all the time, with their American identity telling them to do one thing and their moral identity telling them to do the opposite? We provide two responses to these questions.

First, American identity and moral identity do not always conflict. On the contrary, they are often in line with each other, as was the case when First Lady Michelle Obama made an official visit to Haiti and emphasized “the enduring U.S. commitment to help Haiti recover and rebuild” (BBC News 2010). We propose that American identity and moral identity oppose each other during international wars, but in general, they are consistent.

Second, identities vary in their momentary salience (Ashmore, Deaux, and McLaughlin-Volpe 2004; Reed 2004). If people have just seen a U.S. flag, their American identity is likely salient and will guide their decisions, but if they have just seen a photograph of a moral exemplar such as Gandhi, their moral identity may be salient and will guide their decisions. People are unlikely to feel conflicted in these situations, unless both their American and moral identities become salient at the same time. When the two identities are simultaneously activated in the context of war, U.S. residents may become distressed, because they must choose between being faithful to their American identity or to their moral identity. How people reconcile this conflict is beyond the scope of this article but is a fruitful avenue for further research.

Conclusion

This research shows that the very psychological processes positively associated with support for war (namely, morally disengaging from harm to others, focusing on American identity, and downplaying moral identity) are also negatively associated with charitableness toward foreign civilians. Thus, attempts to drum up support for war and U.S. soldiers may sometimes undermine U.S. residents’ willingness to give their hard earned dollars to charities and CSR campaigns that aid foreign civilians. This trend can be attenuated however by appropriately leveraging the social identities (American and moral) that people value and use in their charitable giving decisions.

Appendix A: Measure of Moral Disengagement from Study 1

The following scale was presented as part of a larger questionnaire, which participants completed after viewing the Abu Ghaib slide show:

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<th>2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. It is alright to fight to protect your friends.
2. It is alright to beat someone who bad mouths your family.
3. It is alright to fight when your group’s honor is threatened.
4. It is all right to lie to keep your friends out of trouble.
5. Some people deserve to be treated like animals.
6. It is okay to treat badly someone who behaved like a “jerk.”
7. Someone who is obnoxious does not deserve to be treated like a human being.
8. Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be hurt.

Appendix B: Measure of American Identity from Study 1

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly Disagree</td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Neither Agree nor Disagree</td>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. It’s great to be an American.
2. I am extremely proud of my affiliation with the United States of America.
3. Being an American is an important part of who I am.
4. Being a member of this country makes me feel like I share a common goal with others.

Appendix C: Measure of Moral Identity from Study 1

Listed alphabetically below are some characteristics that might describe a person:

Caring, Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous, Helpful, Hardworking, Honest, Kind

The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this person would be like, answer the following questions using the scale below:

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<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completely Disagree</td>
<td>Mostly Disagree</td>
<td>Slightly Disagree</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Slightly Agree</td>
<td>Mostly Agree</td>
<td>Strongly Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.
3. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.
4. I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics.
5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as having these characteristics.
6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these characteristics.
7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.
8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my membership in certain organizations.
9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these characteristics.
10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.
Appendix D: Measure Used as a Manipulation Check on the American Identity Prime in Study 2

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Mostly</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Slightly</td>
<td>Mostly</td>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. This slide show has made me proud of what I share with other Americans.
2. This slide show has reminded me of why I love being an American.
3. Thanks to this slide show, I have thought carefully about what being an American means to me.
4. Because of this slide show, I am more convinced than ever that being an American gives me a special heritage that citizens of other countries do not have.
5. This slide show has NOT really heightened my sense of attachment to America.
6. This slide show has led me to consider the positive aspects of my identity as an American.

Appendix E: Measure Used as a Manipulation Check on the Moral Identity Prime in Study 2

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Mostly</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Slightly</td>
<td>Mostly</td>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>Agree</td>
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</table>

1. Thanks to this slide show, I have thought carefully about the moral standards that I want to follow in my day-to-day life.
2. Thanks to this slide show, I have considered the moral principles that I strive to uphold in my daily interactions with other people.
3. Watching this slide show has encouraged me to think about the beliefs and standards that comprise my personal moral code.
4. After watching this slide show, I am NO more inclined than usual to think about my views of myself as a moral person.
5. This slide show has led me to reflect on what it means for me to be a highly moral person.
6. Thanks to this slide show, I have considered what it means for me to exhibit all or most of the following personal qualities: compassionate, caring, fair, friendly, generous, helpful, hardworking, honest, kind.

Appendix F: Measure of Moral Disengagement from Study 2

Use the scale below to indicate how much you agree or disagree with each statement:

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>Mostly</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Slightly</td>
<td>Mostly</td>
<td>Completely</td>
<td>Agree</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Military force is justified when a nation’s economic security is threatened.
2. Military force is justified as a preemptive military strike against nations that threaten one’s security.
3. Military force is justified when diplomacy and negotiations drag on without resolving conflicts.

Appendix G: Measure of Liking for Bottled Water Taste in Study 2

Now we want to get your impressions of the bottled water’s flavor and quality. Please take a look at the scale shown below:

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<th>7</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Does not at all describe</td>
<td>Perfectly describes</td>
<td>the water’s</td>
<td>the water’s</td>
<td>taste</td>
<td>taste</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Now think back to the experience of sampling the bottled water. Then take a look at the list of words shown below. Each of these words could potentially be used to describe the taste of this bottled water. Using the scale provided, please circle the number that best reflects the extent to which each word describes the water’s taste.

1. Refreshing
2. Sickening
3. Satisfying
4. Delicious
5. Energizing
6. Cool
7. Thirst quenching
8. Invigorating
9. Pleasing
10. Tasty

References


