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Operations and Logistics Research Seminars

Past Operations and Logistics Division and Centre for Operations Excellence Seminars

Past OPLOG DIVISION AND COE SEMINARS - Sept 2015-Aug 2016
Past OPLOG Seminars January 2015 -  August 2015
Past OPLOG Seminars - August 2014 - December 2014
Past OPLOG Seminars September 2013 - May 2014

Past OPLOG Seminars - September 2012 - May 2013

Past OPLOG Division Seminars - September 2016 - July 2017

OPLOG Division Seminars - September 2017 - Onwards




Date:  Monday, November 20th, 2017

Speaker: Itai Ashlagi, Stanford University
Topic: "Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets"
Time: 2:30PM - 3:30PM
Place: Henry Angus 333

Abstract: We study how much communication is needed to find a stable matching in a two-sided matching market with private preferences. Segal (2007) and Gonczarowski et al. (2015) showed that, in the worst case, any protocol that computes a stable matching requires the communication cost per agent to scale linearly with the total number of agents. In markets with many thousands of agents, this communication requirement is implausibly high, casting doubt on whether stable matchings can arise in large markets. We study markets with realistic assumptions on the preferences of agents and their available information, and show that a stable matching can be found with a much smaller communication requirement. In our model, the preferences of workers are unrestricted, and the preferences of firms follow an additively separable latent utility model. Our efficient communication protocol modifies the worker-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm by having firms signal workers they especially like while also broadcasting qualification requirements to discourage other workers who have no realistic chances from applying. In the special case of tiered random markets, the protocol can be modified to run in two rounds and involve only private messages. Our protocols have good incentive properties and give insights into how to mediate large matching markets to reduce congestion.

 Link to the paper: https://web.stanford.edu/~iashlagi/papers/communication-complexity-matching-markets.pdf



Date: Monday, November 27th, 2017

Speaker: John Dickerson, University of Maryland
Topic: TBA
Time: 2:30PM - 3:30PM
Place: Henry Angus 969

Abstract: TBA



Date: Monday, January 8th, 2018

Speaker: Vishal Gupta, USC Marshall School of Business
Topic: TBA
Time: 2:30PM - 3:30PM
Place: Henry Angus 969

Abstract
: TBA




Date: Monday, January 15th, 2018

Speaker: Merve Bodur, University of Toronto
Topic:
TBA
Time: 2:30PM - 3:30PM
Place: Henry Angus 969

Abstract: TBA




Date: Monday, January 22nd, 2018

Speaker: Miguel Anjos, Polytechnique Montreal
Topic: TBA
Time: 2:30PM - 3:30PM
Place: Henry Angus 969

Abstract: TBA



Date: Monday, January 29th, 2018

Speaker: Gonzalo Romero, Rotman School of Business
Topic: TBA
Time: 2:30PM - 3:30PM
Place: Henry Angus 969

Abstract: TBA